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COMMENTS
UNIONIZATION OF LAW FIRM ASSOCIATES?
by Mary Emma Ackels
A few years ago it was thought inconceivable that associates in a law
firm would desire to unionize and bargain collectively against the partners
of the firm.' Prior to 1977 the National Labor Relations Board had not
even extended coverage of the National Labor Relations Act to law firms.
In the last year, however, the law in this area has been revolutionized.
The Board has not only extended its jurisdiction to law firms in general,
but it has also allowed legal secretaries, clerks, and even lawyers in legal
service clinics to unionize. In New York City organizational drives have
begun to unionize law office workers.2 The next issue to be addressed by
the Board will undoubtedly be whether associates in a law firm are covered
by the Act or instead fall within the categories excluded from the scope of
the Act. Congress did not intend to include all employees under the Act,
and it is arguable that associates should be excluded as "managerial" or
"confidential" employees as defined by Congress. This Comment dis-
cusses the recent changes in the Board's attitude toward law firms and the
various considerations the Board will encounter in deciding whether to
extend the Act's coverage to law firm associates.
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: JURISDICTION OVER LAW
FIRMS
A. Scope of the National Labor Relations Act
In passing the National Labor Relations Act Congress provided the
Board "the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under
the Commerce Clause."3 Through the Act, Congress sought to regulate
1. Note, The Unionization of Attorneys, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 100 (1971).
2. In spite of various attempts to unionize associates, little success has been made in
actually establishing bargaining units. See Kopel, Unions Knocking at Firms' Doors, Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 4. Perhaps the reason for such lack of interest is that associates
are content with their working conditions and are generally paid well. Id at 11, col. 1. In
Canada, where unionization of law firms has been permitted for a long time, only a few
firms are unionized. Id.
The best way to avoid unionization at a law firm is to use fair employment practices. One
author has noted that "[t]he likelihood of success of union organizing in law firms will vary
in inverse proportion to the excellence of the personnel practices of the employer." Levin,
Foley, Hoag and Beyond- Union Organizing of Law Firms, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 2, 1978, at 28, cols.
3-4.
3. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937).
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industrial relations4 of employers whose activities affected interstate com-
merce. 5 The Board's threshold jurisdictional test is thus "whether the
stoppage of business by reason of labor strife would tend substantially to
affect commerce."6  Since the landmark decision in Wickard v. Filburn,7
Congress is no longer limited to regulating those activities which have a
direct effect on interstate commerce. The Wickard decision determined
that merely showing that the aggregate effect of the activities may produce
an impact on interstate commerce is sufficient.8 The full scope of congres-
sional jurisdiction has been transmitted to the Board through the broad
language of sections 2(6)9 and 2(7)10 of the Act.
The Board does not confine its judgment to the quantitative effect of the
activities before it. Rather, the Board also looks to see if the immediate
situation is representative of many others throughout the country, the total
incident of which if left unchecked might produce a far-reaching impact
on commerce. 1 The Board then views the alleged local activities to deter-
mine whether, in the interlacings of business across state lines, such activi-
ties affect commerce. 2 A business thus may be essentially local in nature
and still subject to the Act, 3 unless the effect on commerce is found to be
de minimis.14 The Board occasionally declines to assert jurisdiction either
because the employer is operating in a "local business,"' 5 or because "the
4. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976):
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment....
5. Id. § 160(a); see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937).
6. Service Stores Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1161, 1162-63 (1945) (emphasis added). See also
NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
7. 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
8. Id. at 127-28; see Katzenbach v. McClung (Ollie's Barbecue), 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Few businesses could have less impact on interstate commerce than Ollie's Barbecue.
9. "The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communi-
cation among the several states .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976).
10. "The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 152(7)
(1976).
11. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963).
12. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944); NLRB v. Conover Motor
Co., 192 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. El Paso-Ysleta Bus Line, Inc., 190 F.2d 261 (5th
Cir. 1951).
13. See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 605 (1938) (while the activity may separately
be viewed as local, it can be reached by federal power if it tends to lead to a labor dispute
burdening commerce); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938) (the
Board has power over a situation that may burden commerce without regard to the source of
the obstruction); Community Currency Exch., Inc. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1972).
14. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939); Community Currency Exch., Inc. v.
NLRB, 471 F.2d 39, 41-42 (7th Cir. 1973) (de minimis limitation held to mean tri-
fies--matters of a few dollars or less). See also NLRB v. Shawnee Milling Co., 184 F.2d 57,
58-59 (10th Cir. 1950).
15. "Local business" is a term used by the Board to explain its refusal to act on certain
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effect of a labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to war-
rant" exercise of jurisdiction.' 6 This failure to exercise jurisdiction does
not, however, result in loss of jurisdiction, 17 and the Board may later re-
evaluate a prior determination that an activity has an insubstantial effect
on commerce. 18
B. Extending Jurisdiction to Law Firms
The Board initially declined to assert its jurisdiction over disputes in-
volving law firms. In Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild9 the
Board recognized its legal authority to assert jurisdiction because the law
firm satisfied the affecting commerce test, but declined to assert its jurisdic-
tion because it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to do so. 21 In
Evans & Kunz, Ltd 21 the Board, while stating that it had the power to
assert jurisdiction, declined to exercise that jurisdiction over a relatively
small law firm.2 2
More recently, the Supreme Court, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,23
held the practice of law to be "trade or commerce" within the meaning of
the Sherman Act.24 In the landmark case of Foley, Hoag & Eliot,25 the
Board, in the light of Goldfarb, re-evaluated its prior decision to exclude
cases in which operations of the employer involved have only remote or insubstantial effect
on interstate commerce. Creative Country Day School at Westchester, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B.
586 (1971).
16. Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 1216 (1972).
17. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); NLRB v. Dixie Terminal
Co., 210 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1015 (1954). Compare Bodle, Fogel,
Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512 (1973), and Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194
N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972), with Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
18. The Board has complete discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction over any in-
dustry for which no jurisdictional yardsticks existed on Aug. 1, 1959, provided the effect of a
labor dispute on commerce is insubstantial. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976).
19. 206 N.L.R.B. 512 (1973). The Board reversed its position in Foley, Hoag & Eliot,
229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
20. 206 N.L.R.B. at 512. The Board found that the law firm did not have a sufficient
impact on interstate commerce to warrant the Act's coverage.
21. 194 N.L.R.B 1216 (1972). This case has never been expressly reversed by the
Board, although its impact has been negated by later Board decisions. See notes 32-38 infra
and accompanying text.
22. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1216. This law firm had gross revenues in excess of $300,000 and
furnished over $50,000 in services to clients who met the Board's jurisdictional standards.
Note that under the jurisdictional test of Camden Regional Legal Servs., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B.
No. 47 (1977), a firm with $250,000 of gross revenues will be subject to the Board's jurisdic-
tion. See notes 33-38 infra and accompanying text.
23. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Court refused to find that Congress intended any sweep-
ing learned profession exclusion from the Sherman Act; moreover, the Court described a
title examination as a service, and the exchange of such a service for money as "commerce"
in the common usage of the term. 421 U.S. at 787-88.
Recent court decisions have held that regardless of the fact that a law firm's effect on
commerce might be insubstantial, law firms, nonetheless, "affect commerce" within the
meaning of that term as used in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976). EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 181 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (citing Evans &
Kunz, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972). See also Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F.
Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
25. 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
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law firms from coverage under the Act. The Board reasoned that Con-
gress intended to exercise fully the same plenary and comprehensive com-
merce power under the National Labor Relations Act that it had exercised
in regulating commerce under the Sherman Act 26 and, thus, the practice of
law was "commerce ' 27 within the meaning of sections 2(6) and 2(7) of the
Act. 28  As a result, the Board asserted jurisdiction over law firms as a
class, 29 and held that file clerks and messengers had the right to petition
for unionization. In Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Services3" the
Board continued the trend set in Foley by asserting jurisdiction 3' over a
nonprofit law clinic that provided legal services to indigent persons within
the state of Michigan. The Board noted that the clinic's operational capi-
tal came, in part, from congressional funds and that the clinic purchased
services from enterprises engaged in interstate commerce.32
The minimum jurisdictional standard for law firms was established in
Camden Regional Legal Services, Inc. 33 The Board held that it would ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act to limit its assertion of jurisdiction to law
firms that receive at least $250,000 in gross annual revenues.34 The Board
also noted that the law firm had a close nexus with interstate commerce
because it purchased goods and services in excess of $50,000 from such
national concerns as IBM, Xerox, Bell Telephone Company, and West
Publishing Company.35 While Camden Legal Services implies that only
26. Id at 457 (citing Van Camp Sea Food Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 537 (1974)); see NLRB v.
Gonzalez Padin Co., 161 F.2d 353, 355 (lst Cir. 1947).
27. While lawyers are engaged in the sale of personal services, the Board has always
applied its jurisdictional standards to employers furnishing intangible services to enterprises
engaged in interstate commerce. Cf. Truman Schlup, 145 N.L.R.B. 768 (1963) (engineering
and surveying services); Browne & Burford, 145 N.L.R.B. 765 (1963) (surveying, design, and
inspection services); Hazelton Laboratories, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1962) (research and
development services); Gray, Rogers, Graham & Osborne, 129 N.L.R.B. 450 (1960) (archi-
tecture, engineering, and surveying); De Leuw, Cather & Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 191 (1947) (ap-
praisal, investigation, and surveys of property); Electrical Testing Laboratories, Inc., 65
N.L.R.B. 1239 (1946) (testing of electrical products); Salmon & Cowin, Inc., 57 N.L.R.B. 845
(1944) (appraising of mining property); W.J. Cochrane, 44 N.L.R.B. 617 (1942) (assaying
and analyzing lead and zinc ores); United States Testing Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 696 (1938) (chemi-
cal and physical analysis of industrial commodities). Further, a labor strife in the law in-
dustry would tend to lead to a substantial impact on interstate commerce, thus meeting the
Board's threshold jurisdictional test. Law firms are not included in the list of those employ-
ers outside the jurisdiction of the Act and the congressional record evidences a legislative
intent to include lawyers within the scope of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (3) (1976).
See also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1974), and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 417 & 540 (1948).
28. 229 N.L.R.B. at 457.
29. Id
30. 229 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1977).
31. See Legal Servs. for N.W. Pa., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1977) (Board asserted juris-
diction over a nonprofit corporation that provided legal services of a civil nature to eligible
low income persons). See also Legal Servs. for the Elderly Poor, 236 N.L.R.B. No. 44
(1978) (Board refused to allow law students to join a bargaining unit of either attorneys or
clerical people; Board did not decide whether law students could form their own unit).
32. 229 N.L.R.B. at 1023.





the dollar volume standard must be met to warrant coverage under the
Act, the Board has in fact examined the nexus36 of the legal operations
with interstate commerce in its recent decisions concerning lawyers. 37
II. UNIONIZATION OF LAW FIRM ASSOCIATES
The right to unionize has been held to be a protected right of association
under the first and fourteenth amendments.38 The right to associate as a
labor union, however, is of limited value without the ability to invoke the
protections of the National Labor Relations Act. Employees who fall
outside the scope of the Act are in a position analogous to that of labor
union members prior to enactment of the Act in 1935.39 They are without
the most basic features of the Act: the right to bargain collectively40 and
the right to seek remedies from the Board when the employer commits an
unfair labor practice.4 ' Yet Congress left those who fall outside the Act's
coverage to their own independent strength, influence, and ability to ad-
vance. The ultimate question is whether Congress intended the Act to
cover law firm associates, or whether associates possess sufficient qualities
to enhance their positions independent of collective pressures.
A. History of Professional Unionization
The Act covers all employees 42 except those Congress specifically or im-
plicitly excluded. The Act, moreover, expressly covers "professional em-
36. The Board looks to the flow of the employer's goods and services into and out of the
state. The Board requires as part of its jurisdictional standards that the operations have an
annual inflow or outflow across state lines of at least $50,000, whether such inflow or outflow
be direct or indirect. The Board has held that the mere showing that the employer's busi-
ness meets only the dollar volume standard is wholly insufficient to confer jurisdiction. In-
ternational Longshoremen & Warehousemen's Union, 124 N.L.R.B. 813, 814-15 (1959).
See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); John Hammond, 160
N.L.R.B. 927 (1966), enforced, 387 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1967). The Board, for example, has
held that an employer that met the dollar volume test was not subject to the Board's jurisdic-
tion because no evidence was introduced as to the extent of the employer's involvement with
the inflow and outflow of goods and services between the states. Absent such proof, the
Board has "no basis upon which to establish legal or statutory jurisdiction." Swift Cleaners,
Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. 752 (1971).
37. Cf. Legal Servs. for N.W. Pa., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1977) (employer received a
budget of $850,000 annually from state and federal governments); Wayne County Legal
Servs., 229 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1977) (employer purchased goods and services in excess of
$52,000 from national concerns and purchased law books from outside the state); Foley,
Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977) (85% of legal services provided were to clients who
are subject to the Act).
38. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); American Fed'n of State, County &
Mun. Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1969).
39. Note, supra note I.
40. Collective bargaining is an essential adjunct to the underlying right to unionize and
rests at the core of the National Labor Relations Act as stated in the Act's Declaration of
Policy: "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association ..... .29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
41. See id §§ 157, 158.
42. Id § 152(3).
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ployees" as defined in section 2(12). Professional employees include
"any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual. . . (ii) in-
volving constant exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance.""
Congress has required that the Board afford professional employees an
opportunity to vote in a separate unit to ascertain whether or not they wish
to have a bargaining representative of their own.45 The relevant legisla-
tive history demonstrates further that when Congress defined "professional
employees," it contemplated coverage of attorneys.
46
The Board has in the past granted only certain types of attorneys cover-
age under the Act.47 The Board has looked to both the legislative history
and the "right of control test"48 to determine whether the bargaining unit
consists of "employees" within the meaning of the Act. An employer-
employee relationship exists "where the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved but
also the means to be used in reaching such end."4 9 In the leading case of
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. 50 the Board determined that a group of
attorneys working in the legal division of an insurance company was cov-
ered by the Act and, thus, could unionize and bargain collectively against
their employer. Each attorney was subject to the "control" and direction
of the employer in the course of his work and could be disciplined for
refusal to follow instructions.5 ' The case, however, contained several dis-
tinguishing factors. The attorneys were hired like all other employees,
worked the same hours, and had the same benefits. The employer as-
signed the cases, prescribed the types of cases for which a jury trial was not
to be requested, and even dictated the affirmative defenses to be pleaded.- 2
In addition, the attorneys' discretion was limited, and they were not per-
mitted to settle any case without the express consent of the employer. 3
43. Id. § 152(12).
44. Id
45. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407 (1948).
46. The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor & Public Welfare stated that the Act
extends to "[plrofessional persons, including architects, engineers, scientists, lawyers, and
nurses. . . ." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 417 (1948). In the
House Conference Report, the Committee referred to the definition of professional employ-
ees and noted that "[t]his definition in general covers such persons as legal, engineering,
scientific and medical personnel together with their junior professional assistants." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 540 (1948).
47. Cf. Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641 (1973) (law faculty); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948) (in-house attorneys).
48. "The Board, in conformity with congressional intent, has followed the usual tests of
the law of agency and has applied the common law 'right of control' test," in order to distin-
guish between an employee and an independent contractor. Deaton Truck Lines, Inc., 143
N.L.R.B. 1372, 1377 (1963), review dismissed, 337 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1964).
49. 143 N.L.R.B. at 1377. See also Albert Lea Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B.
817 (1957).
50. 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948).
51. Id at 1134.
52. Id at 1134-35.
53. Id These attorneys did not even have authority over their own secretary; stenogra-
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The Act's coverage was also extended to attorneys in Air Line Pilots As-
sociation, International.54 Three attorneys comprised the employer's legal
department, handling general legal work and representing the employer in
court and administrative proceedings. 5  The attorneys were found to be
professional employees because they worked without immediate supervi-
sion in nonroutine work and used continuous discretion and judgment. 6
They also possessed the educational background and specialized training
that met the statutory test for professional employees under the Act.57
In Syracuse University5 8 the Board found that members of the law
faculty were professional employees and could become part of either a sep-
arate law school bargaining unit or an overall bargaining unit.59 The
Board reasoned that faculty members were employees and hence had a
legitimate interest under the Act in the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment.6 °
B. Associates as Employees Under the Act
Only in certain types of cases has the Board examined the question of
whether attorneys are employees 6' within the meaning of the Act. The
National Labor Relations Act provides that "[t]he term 'employee' shall
include any employee. . . but shall not include. . . any individual having
the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor., 62  This direct mandate to include "any employee" not ex-
empted must guide the Board in determining whether attorney-associates
phers were drawn from a common pool when needed. The attorneys were not in a position
to formulate, determine, or effectuate management policies and were in no way concerned
with the employer's labor relations policies. Unlike attorneys generally, these attorneys
were salaried, worked regular hours with regular vacations, and their activities were greatly
limited by the policies set forth by their employer. Id at 1136-37.
54. 97 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951).
55. Id. at 931. The attorneys were assisted only by a secretary.
56. Id
57. Id; 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). The professional employees were given the option
to constitute a separate bargaining unit or become part of the over-all unit.
58. 204 N.L.R.B. 641 (1973).
59. Id at 643. See also Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971). For a complete
discussion of law faculty and their role in a bargaining unit, see Brousseau, Collective Bar-
gaining and Private University Governance. A Look from the Law Schools, 29 U. FLA. L. REV.
625 (1977); in this context, see generally Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); Fordham
Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971).
60. 204 N.L.R.B. at 643.
61. In EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975), associates in a
small law firm were found to be employees under a parallel statute, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). The court in Rinella reasoned that the employer hired and
fired the associates, referred a significant number of his cases to associates, and exerted con-
siderable control over compensation of the associates. He further owned all of the fixed
assets and provided office space and equipment for which the associates paid no rent. He.
also hired, assigned, and paid all secretarial and clerical employees, and all outward appear-
ances to the public indicated that the attorneys were employed by the firm. The court noted,
however, that defining jurisdiction in the context of a different statute with different policies
and purposes should not be controlling.
62. 20 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
1978]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW" JOURNAL
are entitled to the Act's coverage.63 When faced with the next question,
whether associates in a law firm are professional employees,64 the Board
may distinguish the fact situation on the basis of one or more factors al-
luded to in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.65 To exclude such associ-
ates from the Act's protection the Board must characterize them as
supervisory, managerial, or confidential employees.
Supervisors. The Act defines supervisors as "any individual having au-
thority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees,
or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action .. ."66 A supervisor thus may be any employee
who exercises authority to make independent decisions in directing the
work of subordinates.67 In response to a Supreme Court decision holding
that foremen were entitled to union membership under the Act,6 8 Congress
expressly excluded supervisors from any bargaining unit in order to avoid
conflicts between the loyalties of an employee who is charged with some
measure of responsibility for managing the employer's business.6 9 Man-
agement must have faithful agents7° not subject to the influence or control
63. See NLRB v. Monterrey County Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 335 F.2d 927 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965).
64. For a discussion of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit of attorneys, see
Note, The Unionization ofLaw Firms, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1008 (1978). For a discussion
of how associates form a labor organization and how the firm should react, see Crawford, A
Union in Your Law Firm, 41 TEX. B.J. 359 (1978).
65. 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948); see notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
67. NLRB v. International Typographical Union, 452 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1971); Mon
River Towing, Inc. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1969).
68. See discussion of this in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (citing
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947)). See also Florida Power & Light
Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 809 (1974).
69. Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 417 U.S. 790,
810-11 (1974); Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974); NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co., 416 U.S. 267, 273 (1974); NLRB v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir.
1971).
70. The legislative history also makes it evident that Congress was concerned with more
than just a conflict of interest in the field of labor relations if supervisors were allowed to
unionize:
Supervisors are management people. . . . They have demonstrated their
ability to take care of themselves without depending upon the pressure of col-
lective action. . . . They abandoned the 'collective security' of the rank and
file voluntarily, because they believed the opportunities thus opened to them
to be more valuable to them than such 'security.' It seems wrong, and it is
wrong, to subject people of this kind, who have demonstrated their initiative,
their ambition and their ability to get ahead, to the levelingprocesses ofseniority,
uniformity and standardization that the Supreme Court recognizes as being
fundamental principles of unionism. [J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1944)]. It is wrong for the foremen, for it discourages the things in them that
made them foremen in the first place. For the same reason, that it discourages
those best qualjied to get ahead, it is wrong for industry, and particularly for
the future strength and productivity of our country.
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 281 n.I 1 (1974) (emphasis added) (quoting H.R.




The courts have adopted a stern test consistent with the position72 that
management must have faithful agents that makes evasion of the supervi-
sory exclusion difficult: "[T]he possession of any one of the authorities
listed in § 2(l 1) [of the Act] places the employee invested with this author-
ity in the supervisory class."7 3 An employee will therefore be classified as
a supervisor if any one of the indicia of supervisory status is present.74
The assistance of a personal secretary, however, will not result in the ex-
clusion under current interpretations.75 While professional employees are
expressly included in the Act, they often exercise supervisory traits over a
secretary. The Board, in an effort to harmonize the practical impact of the
two statutory sections, requires the supervisory functions to be inherent in
the job rather than incidental to the job.76  The Board, however, will not
exclude nominal supervisory employees, but will require supervisors to as-
sert genuine management prerogatives, such as the right to hire, fire, and
discipline. The Board, for instance, refused to extend supervisory status to
relief nurses although they jointly exercised supervisory and nonsupervi-
sory functions.7 7
Generally associates will not meet the required test, and will not be ex-
cluded from the coverage of the Act as supervisors. The right to hire, fire,
or discipline is rarely inherent in the job of an associate. While an associ-
ate may direct the work of his secretary, such incidental supervision is in-
sufficient to warrant exclusion.78
71. Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974). TheCourt further noted that
"history compels the conclusion that Congress' dominant purpose in amending [the Act in
1947] was to redress a perceived imbalance in labor-management relationships that was
found to arise from putting supervisors in the position of serving two masters with opposed
interests." Id at 661-62.
72. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare explained that "[tihere is noth-
ing in the record developed before this committee to justify the conclusion that there is such
a thing as a really independent foreman's organization." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1947). See also H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1947).
73. Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899
(1949); see 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976). See also NLRB v. Elliott-Williams Co., 345 F.2d 460,
463 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1960).
74. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (authority to give direction); NLRB v. Union Bros., 403 F.2d 883 (4th Cir. 1968) (as-
signment of work and higher wages); NLRB v. Howard Johnson Co., 398 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.
1968) (engineering license to perform responsible duties); Filler Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 376
F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1967) (much higher salary than other employees' wages); NLRB v. Ertel
Mfg. Corp., 352 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966) (authority to give
work assignments); Eastern Greyhound Lines v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1964) (power
to discharge or effectively make recommendations to discipline).
75. See generally Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 97 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951).
76. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 723 (1967), enforced, 424 F.2d 1151 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
77. Doctors' Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950 (1970), enforced, 489 F.2d 772
(9th Cir. 1973). See also Stufield Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. 105 (1971); Finkin, The Supervisory
Status of Professional Employees, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1977).
78. In Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 97 N.L.R.B. 929, 931 (1951), the Board implied that the




Managerial Employees. The National Labor Relations Act states that the
status of employees under the Act "shall not include . . . any individual
employed as a supervisor,"79 and defines an employer as including "any
person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly."" ° Read-
ing these two sections together, the Supreme Court noted that Congress
recognized there were other persons, although not specifically defined in
the Act, who were "so much more clearly 'managerial' that it was incon-
ceivable that the Board would treat them as employees."'" This implied
exclusion is based on the principle that when functions and interests of
individuals are more closely allied with management than with production
workers, they are not truly employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of
the Act as read in conjunction with section 2(2).82
In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 13 the Supreme Court analyzed the his-
tory of this longstanding exclusion implicit in the Act. While the original
Wagner Act 4 did not expressly mention the term "managerial employee,"
the Board developed this concept in a series of cases in the Act's early
history. The first cases established that managerial employees were not to
be included in a unit with rank-and-file employees because they were
"closely related to management.""5  Expediters were similarly excluded
from a bargaining unit because "the authority possessed by these employ-
ees to exercise their discretion in making commitments on behalf of the
Company stamps them as managerial. '8 6 In Ford Motor Co. 8 7 the Board
summarized its policy on "managerial employees," stating that they "have
customarily excluded from bargaining units. . . executive employees who
are in a position to formulate, determine and effectuate management poli-
cies. These employees we have considered and still deem to be 'manage-
rial,' in that they express and make operative the decisions of
management."88 At no time had the Board certified even a separate unit
solely of managerial employees or stated that such was possible.8 9
Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,9" the Board continued to
adhere to the exclusion of ali managerial employees.9 ' The Board de-
clared that "[iut was the clear intent of Congress to exclude from the cover-
79. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
80. Id §. 152(2).
81. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 284 (1974).
82. NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 446 F.2d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 1971).
83. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
84. Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976)).
85. Freiz & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943) (Board excluded expediters from proposed
unit of production and maintenance workers).
86. Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944). An expediter contacts vendors,
places orders, keeps records of progress on deliveries, and has the authority to reassign or-
ders. Id
87. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
88. Id at 1322, quoted in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 276 (1974).
89. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 276 (1974).
90. Ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1976)).
91. American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116-17 (1950); Denton's Inc., 83




age of the Act all individuals allied with management. 92  Buyers were
excluded from any bargaining unit because they were authorized to make
substantial purchases for the employer 93 and were authorized to bind the
employer without prior approval94 and, therefore, were considered repre-
sentatives of management.
Until 1970 the Board had never certified a unit of managerial employ-
ees 9 5 and had stated in case after case that managerial employees were not
to be accorded bargaining rights under the Act. 96 This exclusion was also
approved by the courts without exception.97 In 1970, however, the Board
held in North Arkansas Electric Coop., Inc. 98 that buyers were managerial
employees but were nevertheless covered by the Act because there was no
conflict of interest.99 The Eighth Circuit reversed the Board's finding and
held that Congress intended to exclude all true "managerial employ-
ees."'° The court reasoned that the exclusion embraced not only an em-
ployee who may be placed in a conflict of interest, but also one who is
"'formulating, determining and effectuating his employer's policies or has
discretion, independent of an employer's established policy, in the per-
formance of his duties.' "101
In NLRB v. BellAerospace Co. 102 the Supreme Court, analyzing the leg-
islative history of the Act, determined that Congress intended that man-
agement, like labor, have faithful representatives who are not subject to
the influence or control of unions.' 0 3 When Congress passed the Act it
was concerned "with the welfare of 'workers' and 'wage earners' not of the
management.""° Congress determined that management people have the
individual ability to distinguish themselves in their work and thus may not
be accorded bargaining rights under the Act.'l 5
The Supreme Court further determined that "the purpose and legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Board's subsequent and consis-
tent construction of the Act for more than two decades, and the decisions
92. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 (1976).
93. American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116-17 (1950).
94. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 458, 464 (1953).
95. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 287 (1974).
96. Id. at 288 n.14; see, e.g., Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956); Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 458 (1953); American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 15 (1950); Palace
Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320 (1947).
97. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Illinois
Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969); International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 1964).
98. 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
99. Id at 551.
100. NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971), rey'g 185
N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
101. 446 F.2d at 609 (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158
(7th Cir. 1970)).
102. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
103. Id at 281. See also Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 660 (1974)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947)).
104. 416 U.S. at 282.
105. Id at 287 (quoting Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 (1956)).
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of the courts of appeals all point unmistakably to the conclusion that 'man-
agerial employees' are not covered by the Act."' 6 If Congress had in-
tended such management people to unionize, it "most certainly would
have made its design plain."' 7  Other legislation indicated that when
Congress desired to include managerial personnel in the category of em-
ployees, it did so expressly.'0
8
The Court cautioned against the devastating effect of allowing repre-
sentatives of management to unionize by warning that "management and
labor will become more of a solid phalanx than separate factions in war-
ring camps."'0 9  This warning would be particularly appropriate in the
situation of a law firm. The partners in a law firm must be able to rely
confidently on their associates; on their professional representation of the
law firm, and their unequivocal dedication to the client. To allow associ-
ates to unionize may deprive the partners and clients of the loyal represen-
tation to which they are entitled."0 Associates are representatives of the
law firm in the truest sense and Congress clearly stated that "no one,
whether employer or employee, need have as his agent one who is obli-
gated to those on the other side, or one whom, for any reason, he does not
trust."'''
Associates, like buyers and expediters," 12 may have the power to make
commitments on behalf of the firm and to bind the firm in court and in
negotiations without prior approval. The power to settle a case for the
employer without consultation with a higher official or to commit the firm
to a certain course of action in a case before the court may place the associ-
ate within this exclusion. 13 Moreover, when associates attend and con-
tribute to meetings where the firm's policies or rules are decided, they may
be considered to be more akin to management than to the rank-and-file. ' "
The same qualities that so distinguish management from labor and su-
pervisors from laborers, distinguish the lawyer from the secretaries and
clerical aides who need the security of collective bargaining." " While the
success of an attorney's practice necessarily turns on individual character-
istics and abilities, the practice and philosophy of collective bargaining
106. 416 U.S. at 289.
107. Id at 289 n.18.
108. Id at 279.
109. 416 U.S. at 278 (quoting Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)).
110. See416 U.S. at 281.
111. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947) (emphasis in original), cited in
Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 661 (1974).
112. See notes 91-92 supra.
113. Yet mere discretion to argue a particular motion, or take an initial position in a
case, may not be sufficient to justify the exclusion. See generally AFL-CIO, 120 N.L.R.B.
969, 973 (1958) (performance of duties under little supervision, involving exercise of consid-
erable discretion not necessarily indicative of managerial status).
114. See generall, NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 412 F.2d 324, 326 (8th Cir.
1969).
115. Paralegal employees, secretaries, and clerical aides were recently allowed to union-
ize and bargain collectively against their law firm employers. See Camden Legal Servs.,
231 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1977); Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
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looks with suspicion on such individual advantage. 116 Increased compen-
sation that is based on the individual merit of the attorney is awarded at
the cost of collective standards and creates the suspicion of being paid at
the expense of the group as a whole. 1 7 To require the partners in a law
firm to deal with its associates as a union may result in the less qualified
attorneys progressing and benefiting at the expense of the more qualified.
This practice would only encourage mediocrity and would not further the
purposes and policies of the Act. The Supreme Court has determined:
As a standard, the Board must comply, also, with the requirement that
the unit selected must be one to effectuate the policy of the act, the pol-
icy of efficient collective bargaining. Where the policy of an act is so
definitely and elaborately stated, this requirement acts as a permitted
measure of delegated authority." I
To allow associates to unionize and bargain against the partners would be
analogous to putting pressure on the employer "to accord the front line of
management the anomalous status of employees," and would "therefore
flout the national policy.""' 9
Confidential Employees. The Board has consistently excluded "confiden-
tial employees" from coverage under the Act. Although there is no ex-
press statutory exclusion, 2' the Board has recognized that there are certain
employees who act in a confidential capacity and that Congress did not
intend to include them in a bargaining unit. There has been considerable
confusion, however, as to the scope and application of this implicit exclu-
sion. In Ford Motor Co. "21 the Board narrowed its definition of confiden-
tial employees to embrace only those who exercised managerial functions
in the field of labor relations. 22 In amending the Act in 1947 however,
Congress, in its discussion of confidential employees in both the House
and Conference Committee Reports, unmistakably refers to that term as
defined in the House Bill, which was not limited to those in "labor rela-
tions." The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. thus found
that "although Congress may have misconstrued recent Board practice, it
clearly thought that the Act did not cover 'confidential employees' even
under a broad definition of that term."' 23 The Court thus concluded that
Congress intended to exclude all "who receive from their employers in-
formation that not only is confidential but also that is not available to the
public, or to competitors, or to employees generally."' 24
The Board, however, has not expanded its definition of confidential em-
116. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
117. Id at 338-39.
118. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 165 (1941) (emphasis added).
119. Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 662 (1974).
120. B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956); Minneapolis-Moline Co., 85 N.L.R.B.
597 (1949).
121. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
122. Id at 1322.
123. 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 n.12 (1974).
124. Id. at 283 n.12 (emphasis added).
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ployees to encompass the broad congressional exclusion. Despite the ca-
veat of the Supreme Court in Bell Aerospace, the Board still defines this
exclusion narrowly. 25  Under this narrow definition, associates who are
not involved with their law firm's labor relations policies may not be ex-
cluded from bargaining units. 126 But Congress, wary that the Board may
try to include some truly confidential employees, cautioned that
protecting confidential financial information from competitors and
speculators, protecting secret processes and experiments from compet-
itors, and protecting other vital secrets ought not to rest in the admin-
istrative discretion of the Board or on the responsibility of whatever
union happens to represent the employees. The bill therefore excludes
from the definition of employees persons holding positions of trust and
confidence whose duties give them secret information.127
Associates may be excluded from the Act under this broad congressional
definition for it is difficult to conceive of a more confidential relationship
than that of an attorney to his clients. 128 It is often stated that a lawyer is
like a trustee and is held to something stricter than the "morals of the
market place," 129 and only "thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd."' 3 ° Congress
clearly recognized the importance of this common law doctrine in ex-
pressly providing in section 204 of the National Labor Relations Act that:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to require an
attorney. . . to include in any report required to be filed pursuant to
the provisions of this chapter any information which was lawfully
communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a
legitimate attorney-client relationship.
13
A significant problem arises, however, when the lawyer can defend him-
self against an unfair labor practice only through the use of such privileged
information. The Board was aware of this very problem in Evans & Kunz,
125. In Ernst & Ernst Nat'l Warehouse, 228 N.L.R.B. 590, 591 (1977), the Board stated:
The mere handling of or access to confidential business or labor relations in-
formation is insufficient to render an employee 'confidential'; as the Board has
defined this term. Instead, we look not to the confidentiality of information
within the employee's reach, but to the confidentiality of the relationship be-
tween the employee and persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in the
field of labor relations.
126. For a complete discussion of the Board's narrow exclusion as applied to law firms,
see Note, The Unionization of Law Firms, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1008, 1023-27 (1978).
127. NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971) (emphasis in
original) (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1947)).
128. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 4 states the following ethical consider-
ation: "Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper
functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and
secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him." Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A)
under Canon 4 defines "confidence" as the information protected by the attorney-client
privilege and "secret" as "other information gained in the professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolative or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to the client."
129. Meinhard v. Solomon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, J.).
130. Id
131. 29 U.S.C. § 434 (1976).
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Lid,I32 and for that reason declined to assert jurisdiction over law firms.
The Board noted that "to establish the requisite commerce data in any
given case might involve the disclosure of privileged communications or
the alternative of potential liability" for failure to disclose evidence as nec-
essary to defend against the suit.' 3
3
For instance, for a law firm to demonstrate that it does not meet the
jurisdictional $50,000 inflow-outflow requirement might necessitate disclo-
sure of the nature of the client's activities, the nature of the legal work
performed, detailing any contracts made in other states, and all contracts
the client has in other states.' 34 In such event the client would surely as-
sert his privilege to block any disclosure of such information to its compet-
itors or the general public. If the clients claimed their rights to
nondisclosure of this privileged information, the Board could infer that the
evidence that the law firm did not produce would have been unfavora-
ble.' 35 The Board's policy is to assert jurisdiction in any proceeding in
which the employer has failed to cooperate in producing commerce
data. 36 Such was the inference of the Board in a case in which the em-
ployer failed to produce evidence as to its profit-loss position.137 This
places the lawyer in an untenable position, bound by his code of ethics to
withhold the very information that is necessary and required in order to
defend himself. This problem is posed quite clearly in cases like Evans, in
which the subpoena duces tecum demanded a complete examination of all
the law firm's records relating to all clients of the firm. 138
Serious problems would also arise if the law firm were required to de-
fend itself in a suit for an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the
Act.139 The firm could be called upon to demonstrate why it fired an asso-
ciate or why an associate did not receive a salary increase if such a decision
132. 194 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972).
133. Id at 1218; see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 1962) (em-
ployer has a duty to disclose to the Board information necessary to resolve disputes).
134. Under certain circumstances even the name of the client may be privileged and not
subject to disclosure. See NLRB v. Harvey, 262 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Va. 1966). See
generally ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS D.R. 7-106(b)(2).
135. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 285 (3d ed. 1940).
136. When the employer fails to cooperate in the production of necessary commerce in-
formation the Board will assert jurisdiction if the record shows some legal jurisdiction of the
Board, even if the dollar standards have not been met. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 122 N.L.R.B.
121 (1958).
137. NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952).
138. The subpoena required the production of the following documents:
1. Your records of all clients of the firm of Evans & Kunz, Ltd. to whom said
firm rendered services during the 12-month period preceding [July 22,] 1970.
2. Such records as show the general nature of business of each of the clients
of the aforesaid firm of Evans & Kunz, Ltd. to whom the firm rendered serv-
ices during the 12-month period preceding July 22, 1970.
3. Such records as show the principal place of business of each of the clients
of the firm of Evans & Kunz, Ltd. to whom said firm rendered services during
the 12-month period preceding July 22, 1970.
Brief of the American Bar Association as amicus curiae at 6-7, Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194
N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
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were questioned by the associate before a grievance-arbitration proceed-
ing. The partners would have to disclose confidential or secret informa-
tion relating to the performance of the associate in his dealings with clients
in order to establish that there was good cause for the discharge. The
Board would have to scrutinize the details of the performance in each case
as well as the quality of representation by the associate. This would re-
quire a firm to disclose publicly the dealings of each associate in compari-
son to the one in question in order to demonstrate fair treatment.
Moreover, in a grievance and arbitration procedure, the employee, or
his bargaining representative, frequently has broad access to the records of
the employer relating to matters such as work assignments. 40  The pro-
duction of such records would necessarily involve disclosure of confiden-
tial, privileged information. In the final analysis, it is the client who
would suffer from disclosure of his financial information, contacts, and le-
gal problems.
While the Board has extended the coverage of the Act to attorneys in
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,141 the entire emphasis of that opinion
was on the distinctions between attorneys on the regular payroll of a cor-
poration and attorneys engaged in the private practice of law. 142  The
Board did not address the issue of attorney-client privilege.' 43 The appli-
cation of the privilege to corporate in-house counsel is more difficult to
delineate and define.' 44 More importantly, consideration of the need to
protect confidential information in the context of a case such as Lumber-
men's Mutual does not involve third parties. The attorney-client privilege
in the Lumbermen's Mutual case belonged to the employer because the
employer was the sole client of the attorneys involved. In the case of the
attorney engaged in private practice, the privilege belongs to his clients. 45
The clients are not involved in labor relations disputes that might exist
between the attorney and his employees. The policy considerations that
necessitate recognition of the privilege in the first instance obviously have
far greater weight when rights of innocent third parties will be
prejudiced. 146
140. See Vertol Division, Boeing Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 421 (1970); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1478 (1965).
141. 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948).
142. Id. at 1134-35.
143. Many Board decisions in which jurisdiction was asserted generally did not consider
the potential problems created by the disclosure of privileged, confidential communications.
Cf Butte Medical Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967) (proprietary hospitals); University
Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263 (1967) (nursing); Dr. J.C. Campbell, 157 N.L.R.B.
1004 (1966) (dentists). But see Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
144. See Radiant Burners,. Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
145. E.g., Abbott v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 19, 177 P.2d 317 (1947); Russell v.
Second Nat'l Bank, 136 N.J.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211 (1947).
146. The ABA has sanctioned unionization of in-house counsel for limited purposes, but
has not extended such sanction to attorneys in private practice.
It is our opinion, therefore, that lawyers who are paid a salary and who are
employed by a single client employer may join an organization limited so/ely
to other lawyer employees of the same employer for the purpose of negotiating
1002 [Vol. 32
COMMENTS
In Foley, Hoag & Eliot147 the Board took note of the significant confi-
dentiality problems which may arise from the unionization of the secretar-
ies and other staff employees in a law firm.' 48 The seriousness of the
situation will be magnified if attorneys themselves are allowed to unionize.
The Supreme Court has declared that Congress intended to exclude all
confidential employees within the broad meaning of the term. "Surely
Congress could not have supposed that while 'confidential secretaries'
could not be organized, their bosses could be."' 4 9
III. CONCLUSION
There are numerous considerations that the Board must encounter in
determining whether Congress intended associates to be covered as em-
ployees within the meaning of the Act. While associates do resemble pro-
fessional employees in their constant exercise of discretion, they also bear
the qualities of management. More importantly, the Board as well as the
courts will have to examine the nature of the attorney's role since associ-
ates are arguably confidential employees. Whatever the Board's decision,
its effects will be far-reaching and strongly felt in the legal profession.
wages, hours and working conditions with the employer client so long as the
lawyer continues to perform for his employer client professional services as
directed by his employer and in accordance with the provisions of the Canons
of Ethics.
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 986 (1967) (emphasis in
original).
147. 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
148. Two members of the Board determined:
[Attorneys-whether representing management or labor-who participate in
the formulation and effectuation of their clients' labor relations policies per-
form the same function for their client as would labor relations officials em-
ployed directly by the client. Therefore, when employees of attorneys assist in
such matters, they-no less than aides of labor relations officials-are argua-
bly 'confidential employees' within the meaning of Board precedent.
Id. at 457.
149. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 284 (1974).
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